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Now I observe that when we are met together in the Assembly, 
and the matter at hand relates to building, the builders are 
summoned as advisersj when the question is one ofshipbuild­
ing, then the shipwrightsj and the like ofother arts which they 
think capable ofbeing taught and learned. And ifsome person 
offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to be 
an expert craftsman, even though he be good-looking and rich 
and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at 
him ... . But when the question concerns an affair ofstate, then 
everybody is free to get up and give advice. (Plato 17) 
Peter Evans, attorney and all-around good guYi returned to his apart­
ment in Los Angeles after identifying a billionaire client's dead body. 
He was exhausted. In the past week, he had been stricken by frostbite 
in the Antarctic, attacked by man-made lightning storms in Arizona 
and California, swept up in a flash flood, suspected ofmurder, and 
nearly fired from his firm. All he wanted was a shower and a little rest, 
but he was instead conked on the head and dragged into the living 
room by three masked men who pinned him down and placed a very 
small, very angryj very poisonous Australian octopus under his arm. 
Within minutes, he lay paralyzed, his mind racing, convinced that his 
life was about to end (Crichton 241-432). But unknown to Evans, he 
could not die, not at least within the pages ofMichael Crichton's 2004 
techno-thriller State ofFear, for what good is a science fiction novel 
with a dead hero? 
Crichton's fourteenth novel contains all ofthe essential elements 
that would catapult it onto the bestseller list: fast-paced action, a cast 
ofattractive and intelligent heroes and heroines, and truly villainous 
evil-doers who need to be thwarted by the intrepid Evans. But it also 
contains a surplus ofsurprises, such as footnotes, graphs, an "author's 
message," a twenty-one page annotated bibliography, and an essay 
titled "Why Politicized Science Is Dangerous:· Whywould Crichton 
embellish his novel with theoretical scientific claims supported by 
research and presented with the apparatus ofscholarship? Crichton's 
not-so-subtle attempts to show the "fact" behind his fiction is required 
because his antagonists are well-meaning environmentalists and his 
message is that global warming is a conspiracy perpetrated by the 
"politico-legal-merua complex." The aura of scholarship Crichton cre­
ates is anticipated by historian Richard Hofstadter, who points out the 
tendency ofpolitical paranoids to use the mechanics ofscholarship in 
marshaling cases whose fanciful conclusions do not satisfy the rigorous 
norms ofscholarship (35-37). Therefore, one might expect Evans to 
provide such arguments and evidence. But, in this case, it is not Crich­
ton's hero who is substantiating his conclusions, but Crichton himself 
Few read Crichton's book as anything other than a work ofscience 
fictionj however, the attention the novel received positioned Crichton 
to become the subject of a heated debate about scientific expertise. 
Alan Miller, in his review ofthe bookfor Issues in Science and Technol­
ogy, notes that State ofFear made it to bookstore shelves just months 
after the debut ofThe Day After Tomorrow, a movie depicting the 
potential impacts of abrupt climate change: "The film generated a few 
fundraising events for environmental groups, but there was little ifany 
effort to present The Day After Tomorrow as a serious scientific state­
ment. In contrast, Crichton has been treated as ifhe actually possessed 
a deep understanding ofclimate science" (94). Crichton's success as a 
science fiction writer garnered him speaking invitations at a number of 
unlikely places: he was the subject ofa 20/20 news segment, an inter­
viewed guest of Charlie Rose on PBS, a featured speaker at the Ameri­
can Enterprise Institute and California Institute ofTechnology, and, 
perhaps most surprising, a witness before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works in 2005, for which the committee 
chairperson, Senator James Inhofe (R-0K), made the novel required 
reading (Janofsky 94). Members ofthe Committee on Environment 
and Public Works were divided in their assessments of Crichton's abil­
ity to testify about real scientific issues and processes, but the media 
spectacle surrounding Crichton's work provided the potential for 
broad political and public influence. Sam Leith of The Daily Telegraph 
notes: "Michael Crichton will do more to popularize contrarian views 
ofecology than Bj0rn Lomborg, as a popular scientist, could ever 
manage" (7). Crichton, a licensed but non-practicing medical doctor 
turned successful science fiction writer, was thus transformed into an 
expert voice ofscientific skepticism. 
Crichton's global climate change testimony and the discourse 
surrounding it serves as an important case study concerning the nar­
rative construction ofscientific expertise. More specifically, Crichton 
engaged in what science studies scholar Thomas F. Gieryn has called 
rhetorical "boundary-work" ( Gierynj Gieryn, Bevins, and Zehr). By 
positioning himselfas a celebrity science writer with knowledge of 
scientific principles and methods byvirtue ofhis medical training, a 
position he advances through the use ofnarrative, Crichton attempts 
to dissociate climate scientists from "real" scientists. Crichton argues 
climate scientists are not scientists at all. How Crichton does this is 
worthy ofattention because, as public policy scholars Frank Fischer 
andJohn Forrester have argued, "As massive environmental problems , 
loom before us, political talkwill become more and not less impor­
tant" ( 13). Based on the critical role narrative plays in influencing 
public understanding ofenvironmental problems, how experts manage 
to marshal narratives while speaking about subjects on which they are 
not traditionally trained becomes all the more salient for those who 
genuinely seek the best outcomes from political hearings and demo­
cratic processes (Hajerj Kaplan). This essay provides an overview 
ofthe rhetoric ofscience literature informing our analysis, explores 
the rhetorical construction ofCrichton's testimony, and notes the 
implications for scholarly understanding ofthe link between narrative 
and boundary-work as well as climate change communication. 
Scientific Expertise and the Rhetoric ofBoundary-Work 
Philosophers and sociologists ofscience have long debated about the 
"problem ofdemarcation" (Taylorj Popper). What counts as science? 
And what counts as pseudo-science or non-science? In essence, the 
demarcation problem is one concerned with identifying "unique and 
essential characteristics ofscience that distinguish it from other kinds 
ofintellectual activities" ( Gieryn 781). Gieryn has argued that one way 
to conceptualize how scientists separate science from non-science is 
accomplished by using "boundary-work." By boundary-work, Gieryn 
means scientists' general "attribution ofselected characteristics to 
the institution ofsci~nce (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of 
knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes ofconstruct­
ing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities 
as 'non-science"' (782). Scientific boundaries, thus, are rhetorically 
constructed and open to ideological debate. 
One common issue related to boundary-work involves the notion 
of"independentverification'' as an essential component ofthe scientif­
ic method. Karl Popper, in The Logic ofScientific Discove1")'J for example, 
comments on how philosophers ofscience see verification as one way 
oftesting scientific theories: "[l]fthe singular conclusions tum out 
to be acceptable, or verified, then the theory has, for the time being, 
passed its test" ( 33). Ultimatel)'j Popper argues that falsification, rather 
than verification, is the proper criterion ofdemarcation ( 40). Clearl)'j 
the very idea ofindependent verification as an essential component 
of the scientific method is a rhetorical and narrative construction. 
There is no one, single scientific method, as Feyerabend also notes. 
Feyerabend insists on "independent verification" as a key element in 
the scientific method is part ofonly one possible scientific/rhetori­
cal assemblage. For Feyerabend, "the ev:ents, procedures and results 
that constitute the sciences have no common structurej there are no 
elements that occur in every scientific investigation" ( 1). However, 
this is not to say that appeals to scientific verification have lost their 
persuasive potency. As Crichton's testimony illustrates, these rhetorical 
constructions are as popular today as ever. 
Ifconcepts such as independent verification and scientific method 
can be appropriated rhetorically by public policymakers, then us­
ing experts and expertise to advance particular causes and values is a 
real possibility. On this count, Frederick Frankena's observations are 
insightful: 
Scientists and technicians are seldom called upon to find or apply 
scientific facts to the exclusion ofsocial value judgments. Studies of 
technical controversies, particularly environmental controversies, have 
demonstrated that experts and expertise are often employed to mask 
political choices. Studies have also revealed that, in response, counter 
expertise is utilized in an attempt to open the decision-making process. 
Indeed, experts and expertise have become a political resource, not 
simply the wellspring ofscientific truth or new technology. ( 31) 
Boundary-work is one way scientists can and do privilege one view 
ofscience over others. When used in deliberative settings, boundary­
work likewise serves particular political interests and values. How one 
constructs what "counts" as science has far-reaching implications for 
important questions ofpublic policy. Boundary-work, and the stories 
employed by those engaging in this work, not only help clarify what 
is or is not science, but they also help clarify who can and cannot be 
considered a scientist. 
Crichton's Narrative Critique: 
FromWriting Science Fiction to Challenging Scientific Method 
Invited by well-known climate skeptic Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), 
then chair ofthe U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, Michael Crichton testified before a star-struck audience on 
September 28, 2005, and the experience contained elements of the 
politically surreal. According to journalist Jamie Wilson, Republican 
senators "rushed to shake the author by the hand yesterday as he ar­
rived in the oak-paneled committee room" ( 1). Crichton's imposing 
physical stature added to the mood as reporters noted his unusual 
height with estimates ranging from 6-feet-7 -inches to a staggering 
"6-foot-9-inchframe" (Wilson 1jJanofskyE1), as ifhis size would 
intensify his points. Crichton opponents were also out in full force. 
Fliers from the Natural Resources Defense Council noted Crichton 
was "more silly than scary," while the Union of Concerned Scientists 
claimed Crichton's testimony would not "reflect scientific fact" (Janof­
sky El). Although the spectacle surrounding Crichton's appearance 
is itself possibly worthy ofanalysis, his testimony, the stories he told, 
holds most narratological relevance. 
As is standard practice in Congressional hearings, Crichton cir­
culated his prepared documents to committee members well before 
speaking. His fidelity to his written words is evident in the way he 
chose to deliver the speech: while it appears he attempted to extem­
porize slightly, Crichton was tied to his manuscript and presumably 
Crichton departed very little from his initial thoughts. The introduc­
tion of Crichton's address followed the conventions ofSenate expert 
testimony. After thanking the Chair and the members ofthe com­
mittee, a seated Crichton quickly set about advancing his argument 
concerning "the important subject ofpoliticization ofresearch." From 
the outset, Crichton made it dear to his audience that he would not be 
regurgitating the conspiracy theory fiction found in his newest best­
seller. Instead, he wanted to address the importance ofhaving "inde­
pendent verification" in science. Surely Crichton realized the reasons 
he had been invited to give testimony were potentially at odds with 
establishing his credibility as a scientist. 
In his testimony, Crichton established himself firmly among phi­
losophers ofscience, explaining how he subscribes to a view ofscience 
that relies on the use ofa fixed method: 
[S] cience is nothing more than a method ofinquiry. The method 
says an assertion is valid - and merits universal acceptance - only if 
it can be independently verified. The impersonal rigor ofthe method 
means it is utterly apolitical. A truth in science is verifiable whether you 
are black or white, male or female, old or young. It's verifiable whether 
you like the results ofa study, or you don't. 
The key point in Crichton's opening comments is not about the 

existence of a material truth, but in how one creates epistemic claims 

using the scientific method. For Crichton, the acid test of scientific 
validity is independent verification. According to Crichton's simplified 
formulation, it is only through verification that "the scientific method 
can transcend politics." However, he also foreshadows his later critique 
ofclimate scientists by noting that not adhering to independent veri­
fication means science may be "overwhelmed by competing interests:' 
But what counts as verification? Crichton realizes the burden he has 
created for himself, and offers one possible way ofunderstanding the 
scientific method. 
Crichton understands that "verification may take several forms:' 
However, Crichton tendentiously maintains that the "gold standard" of 
verification can be found in the field ofmedicine, an area ofscientific 
practice with which he is familiar. This decision to look to medicine as 
a means ofunderstanding how science should function allows Crich­
ton to narrate his way past a number ofrhetorical constraints. First, 
this perspectival shift preempted arguments from politicians who were 
concerned about Crichton's credentials as a fiction writer. For example, 
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) pointedly noted the committee needed 
to "focus on facts, not fiction" (Janofsky E 1). However, Crichton re­
jects the boundaries Boxer would establish for his testimony. Crichton 
anchors his expertise in medicine, a field where his credentials would 
be difficult to challenge given his medical education at Harvard. Thus, 
Crichton deflects accusations that he was unqualified to testify about 
scientific issues because he made his living as a novelist. Second, Crich­
ton's use ofmedicine as a means to understand the scientific method 
gave him rhetorical traction with those who were likely to see the field 
ofmedicine as a long established scientific discipline. Medical testing, 
Crichton argued, is as scientific as a scientific field can be, especially 
with its "randomized double-blind study" ofvirtually all subjects 
within its purview. 
Crichton offered policymakers a telling anecdote that uses medi­
cine as a way ofhighlighting what it means to have independent veri­
fication in science. In 1991, Crichton was returning on a plane from a 
trip to Germany when he encountered a sobbing man. This man was a 
doctor involved in a multi-year, multi-million dollar double-blind study 
testing the effectiveness ofa new drug who "had been sitting in the 
Frankfurt airport, innocently chatting with another man, when they 
discovered to their mutual horror they [were] on two different teams 
studying the same drug. They were required to report their encounter 
to the FDA:' The story illustrated dramatically the "gold standard" of 
independent verification. Should there be any chance ofcontamination 
in the study, the contamination should be immediately reported and 
the study considered invalid because this is what it means to live up to 
a high "degree ofrigor in research:' Here was a convincing example­
what Kenneth Burke calls a "representative anecdote"-ofhowironic 
misfortune should not be permitted to derail sound scientific practice. 
Crichton's subsequent attacks against climate scientists were 
scathing. He argued that unlike medical researchers, climate scien­
tists, especially climate modelers, were prone to make mistakes that 
compromised the integrity of the scientific method. Unlike the careful 
control in medical research, climate science follows its own methods, 
as Crichton posits: 
[I]t's permissible for raw data to be "touched; or modified, by 
many hands. Gaps in temperature and proxy records are :filled in. 
Suspect values are deleted because a scientist deems them erroneous. 
A researcher may elect to use parts ofexisting records, ignoring other 
parts ... But the fact that the data has been modified in so many ways 
inevitably raises the question ofwhether the results ofa given study are 
wholly or partially caused by the modifications themselves. 
In other words, Crichton summarizes, "What is at issue is whether 
the methodology ofclimate science is sufficiently rigorous to yield a 
reliable result:' Could climate scientists say their methods meet the 
rigorous standards ofindependent verification, given all ofthe manipu­
lation and tampering? For Crichton, the answer was a resounding 
"no:' However, to support this interpretation Crichton needed toil­
lustrate that climate scientists were guilty of"touching" their data. He 
needed to make climate scientists appear as bungling incompetents in 
his narrative. 
Crichton was not the only person making news by arguing against 
the faith many had about the status ofclimate change science. Only 
two years earlier the well-known "hockey-stick" graph ofclimate tem­
peratures was also being extensively reported by journalists. Taking the 
hockey-stick study written by Dr. Michael Mann and his colleagues as 
a representative anecdote ofscientific rigor in climate change studies, 
Crichton argued that climate scientists had often failed to use inde­
pendent verification when conducting their research; therefore, later 
attempts to replicate the research could not substantiate it: 
But real fireworks began when two Canadian researchers, Mcintyre 
and McKitrick, attempted to replicate Mann's study. They found grave 
errors in the work, which they detailed in 2003: calculation errors, data 
used twice, data filled in, and a computer program that generated a 
hockeystick out ofany data fed to it- even random data. Mann's work 
has since been dismissed as "phony" and "rubbish'' by scientists around 
the world who subscribe to global warming. 
While Crichton's claim that Mann's work has been "dismissed" is 
perhaps overstated, his use ofthe controversy provides yet another 
powerful indictment against climate scientists. Ultimately, Crichton 
argues, organizations such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) accepted Mann's work because the IPCC is "under no 
obligation" to perform independent verification. 
With Mann's work, however, at least it was possible to argue the 
results had been verified, although clearly Crichton disagrees (Besel). 
Crichton's critique ofMann's work was pointed, but his harshest criti­
cism was directed toward climate modelers. With the use ofclimate 
models, independent verification is virtually impossible, yet climate 
models are one of the key tools used by policymakers in making deci­
sions on an array ofissues. For Crichton, climate models are scientifi­
cally useless: 
But ifindependent verification is the heart of science, what should 
policymakers do with research that is unverifiable? For example, the 
U.N. Third Assessment Report defines general circulation climate 
models as unverifiable. Ifthat's true, are their predictions ofany use to 
policymakers? Arguably not. Senator Boxer has said we need more sci­
ence fact. I agree-but a prediction is never a fact. 
With this passage, Crichton's critique ofthe climate change "sci­
ence"-not just the politically skewed predictions ofsome doomsday­
ers-was complete. After establishing what he believed was the gold 
standard ofscientific practice, a reliance on independent verification, 
Crichton attempted to illustrate where climate change "science" failed 
to live up to the scientific community's standard. 
Conclusion 
Given his constraint~, Crichton cleverly maneuvered his way out of 
a potential credibility problem. Crichton did not rely on the fiction 
found in his bestseller, nor did he attempt to position himselfas a cli­
mate change expert, nor did he position himself as someone concerned 
with selling novels. Instead, he chose to anchor his narrative critique in 
a general understanding ofscientific method supported by his knowl­
edge ofmedical practice in anticipation ofwhat he believed audience 
members would think ofhis intentions. In other words, Crichton 
managed the appearance ofhis intentions, a rhetorical choice similar to 
what Lisa Zunshine has noted in her work on "levels ofintentionality:' 
Although this inventional decision did not directly lead to the passage 
oflegislation, the success ofhis rhetoric allowed Crichton to gain the 
praises ofmany senators who were skeptical ofclimate change studies. 
In addition, Crichton remains an important name in contemporary 
climate change discussions. In terms ofadjusting his rhetoric to his 
given situation, Crichton's decisions illustrate why many have viewed 
him with a sense ofrespect approaching reverence. However, this is not 
to say Crichton's position is the correct one. 
Although Crichton should be given credit for his careful narrative 
navigation ofpolitically dangerous terrain, we must remember that 
boundary-work is a rhetorical process that, to invoke Burke, involves 
both selection and deflection (59). For example, while it is true that 
Michael Mann and his colleagues were questioned about their sci­
entific procedures, one could argue their hockey-stick study held up 
surprisingly well (Besel). In 2003, Mann even testified before a House 
committee that studies conducted by him and other independent 
researchers supported the findings ofthe original1998 study, thus 
providing evidence the hockey-stick study was independently verified. 
Of course, if Crichton were to mention these alternative readings of the 
scientific literature, his narrative would lose what rhetorician Walter 
Fisherwould call its "sense ofcoherence" (299). 
On a more theoretical level, Crichton's testimony also illustrates 
how narrative and boundary-work function together. As a locus ofargu­
mentation, boundary-work is what Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts­
Tyteca would call an "associate/dissociative" strategy (190-91). Where 
one rhetorically places a field's boundaries determines who belongs in 
the in-group and who does not. However, Crichton's testimony brings 
into sharp focus the details ofhow one can dissociate an entire group 
ofpeople from the classification of"scientist" through the selective 
use ofnarrative. A scientific analogy helps with this explanation. The 
narrative logic ofCrichton's testimony relies on a structural under­
standing ofthe relationship between science as an abstract concept and 
its specific practice analogous to the relationship that exists between a 
genus and a variety ofspecies. For Crichton, science (genus) must have 
independent verification. Medicine is one field (species) that illustrates 
this notion. Attacking climate science (species) by noting the ways 
it may lack independent verification, Crichton attempts to sever the 
associative relationship that connects climate studies to science more 
generally. In other words, climate sciences, such as climate modeling, 
do not really belong to the genus. By extension, climate scientists are 
not really scientists. 
Although this case study illuminates the complex relationships 
between scientific expertise, narrative, and boundary-work, the 
genus-species logic that informs Crichton's boundary-work is not 
unique to his testimony. Instead, this rhetorical technique is often 
employed within skeptical climate change discourse and other areas of 
narrative contestation where one group is told they no longer belong. 
Indeed, cases such as game show host Bob Barker testifying about 
the Captive Elephant Accident Prevention Act, actor Kevin Costner 
testifying about offshore oil spills, and Backstreet Boys band member 
Kevin Richardson testifying about mountaintop removal all point to 
the ubiquitous nature ofcelebrity presence in Congressional hear­
ings. Given recent celebrity testimonies, it is difficult to disagree with 
Neil Postman's sweeping observation that we no longer argue with 
propositions exclusively, but instead have come to rely more on "good 
looks, celebrities, and commercials" (93) over evidence ofthe scien­
tific method. It's no wonder that newspaper accounts ofCrichton's 
testimony to Congress emphasized his imposing stature-his celebrity 
status-more so than the content ofhis objections. According to rhe­
torical scholars Christopher R. Darr and Harry C. Strine, at least 400 
celebrity witnesses have testified before Senate and House hearings. 
Such celebrities potentially bring media focus to hearings that might 
otherwise remain obscure, each participant having his or her own 
reasons to take the media spotlight with them to dark-paneled hear­
ing rooms. As politicians hope that celebrities will publicize hearings, 
celebrities hope, in tum, that participation in a Congressional hearing 
will impart an air ofgravitas to them or their chosen causes. And, of 
course, the appearance ofsomeone such as Crichton gives ample op­
portunity for media speculation about the nature ofhis motivations, 
which makes the appearance yet more newsworthy. In all, it is theater 
at many levels-perhaps even what Guy Debord would call part of"the 
society of the spectacle"-both by design and by perception: Crichton 
ambiguously speaking disinterestedly on behalfof the public good, 
or promoting a new book, or advancing his own celebrity. The uneasy 
tension among these interactions and perceptions makes for spectacu­
lar performance and teaches a lesson on narrative boundary-work to 
the entire nation. 
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